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Under South Africa’s ‘opt-in’ policy of HIV testing, only about half 
of the 80% of  pregnant women having access to prevention of 
mother-to-child transmission (PMTCT) of HIV programmes accept 
HIV testing – a test that is necessary for entry into the PMTCT 
programme.1
To alleviate the general problem of low uptake of HIV testing, 
some parties (including Justice Edwin Cameron of the Supreme 
Court of Appeal of South Africa) have advocated a policy of routine 
‘opt-out’ HIV testing which, in an antenatal care setting, would 
mean that pregnant women are tested unless they indicate other-
wise.2 Such an opt-out policy would, however, be unacceptable in 
South Africa (SA) as it is deemed not to satisfy the counselling and 
informed consent requirements stipulated by law. The Health Pro-
fessions Council of South Africa and the South African Medical 
Association hold similar sentiments.3
Insofar as the opt-out approach is not deemed sufficiently vol-
untary, it can be regarded as coercive or limiting of liberty. Ques-
tions may then be raised about individual liberty (or right to au-
tonomy) and when it may be justified to restrict this. In the case 
under discussion, it specifically raises the issue of whether the 
putative tension between the pregnant woman’s autonomy and 
the widely presumed parental responsibility of acting for the child’s 
benefit should ultimately lean in favour of the unborn child or the 
mother. Posed differently: under what circumstances is it justified 
for a woman to choose to opt out of a programme which could 
reduce the chances of passing HIV to her child from about 35% 
to about 2%?4
In attempting to answer this question, one may refer to the so- 
called liberty-limiting principles whose utility is in defining condi-
tions in which coercive measures may be justifiably imposed in a 
free society. In this paper, I use the harm principle (perhaps the 
best known of the liberty-limiting principles) to argue for routine 
antenatal HIV testing in SA. I argue that, in a context where there 
is access to HIV treatment and for the woman who has decided to 
take the pregnancy to term and is under no genuine fear of part-
ner violence related to HIV testing, the coercive policy of routine 
testing is justifiable as it promises to prevent severe and wrong-
ful harm to the unborn baby. This will build on McQuoid-Mason’s 
recent work in which he used the four principles approach to ar-
gue for routine testing.3 I commence with a brief exploration of 
the concept of harm itself, followed by observations of what such 
concepts mean for the case in point.
The harm principle
The harm principle states that ‘[t]he only purpose for which power 
can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized com-
munity, against his will, is to prevent harm to others’.5 Despite its 
apparent simplicity, the harm principle is ‘a mere convenient ab-
breviation for a complicated statement that includes, among other 
things, moral judgements and value weightings of a variety of 
kinds’.6 Two issues concerning the principle also need noting:
•    The harm principle may be applied ex ante or ex post; the ex 
post version holds that a coercive measure can only be justi-
fied if it in fact prevents or reduces certain harm, while the ex 
ante allows the coercive measure if it prevents or reduces risk 
of harm.7 Our present discussion will concern itself with the ex 
ante in which actions are not certain to cause harm but have 
such a significant probability of producing consequences so 
bad that any chance of their occurrence may be deemed unac-
ceptable.
•    The proposed coercive measure does not only need to be nec-
essary, but also should be superior to any other non-coercive 
alternatives of trying to achieve the same ends.7
Feinberg’s concept of harm
At the heart of the harm principle seems to be the question of ex-
actly what constitutes harm. One prominent interpretation by Fein-
berg conceives harm as ‘the thwarting, setting back, or defeating 
of an interest’6 (an interest meaning: having a stake in something). 
Interests so defined can be of the ulterior or of the welfare type.
Ulterior interests consist of an individual’s ultimate goals and 
aspirations (e.g. academic aspirations), which define what an indi-
vidual’s idea of a good life is but are not necessarily things that one 
absolutely needs for survival. Welfare interests, in contrast, are 
the minimal basic goods that are common to all people regardless 
of  their conception of the good life, and include such interests as 
being alive, free, healthy, in supportive relationships, etc. Because 
they are so basic, they can be seen as the basis for moral rights 
that one can reasonably claim against others. In Feinberg’s words, 
welfare interests ‘cry out for protection’6 because their violation 
constitutes serious harm to an individual.
In what sense, then, is harm referred to in the harm principle? 
According to Feinberg, ‘only setbacks of interests that are wrongs, 
and wrongs that are setbacks to interest …’6 are to count as harms 
in the harm principle; wrongful harms are defined as any indefen-
sible or inexcusable setting back of another’s interests.
One may ask how great such an indefensible harm should be 
for the harm principle to warrant coercion to prevent it. Here, Fein-
berg suggests that the legal maxim De minimis non curat lex (The 
law does not concern itself with trifles) should apply. This maxim 
excludes trivial harms from legal protection, as legal interference 
with trivia may result in more harm than it  prevents, not only to the 
person who has been harmed, but even to his/her victim as well. 
For my purposes here, it is perhaps enough to simply observe 
that, whatever the definition of a trivial harm may be, it cannot pro-
duce an outcome where frustrations of welfare interests become 
trivial harms.
The harm principle and the ethics of routine antenatal 
HIV testing
In the following, I defend the thesis that, according to the harm 
principle, and except where there is a genuine fear of partner vio-
The harm principle and the ethics of routine antenatal HIV 
testing in South Africa
Mpho Selemogo, BMedSci, MB BS, MA
Nyangabgwe Referral Hospital, Francistown, Botswana
20         June 2009, Vol. 2, No. 1  SAJBL
    Article
21         June 2008, Vol. 1, No. 1  SAJBL
lence, the coercive policy of routine testing is justifiable because it 
may prevent severe and wrongful harm to the unborn baby.
1. Declining the HIV test (and therefore PMTCT) exposes the 
baby to unacceptably high risk. Both the probability of infection 
and the magnitude of the consequences of  infection, according 
to the ex ante view, would warrant the use of the harm principle. 
Regarding PMTCT, the choice as mentioned is roughly between 
a 35% chance of infection (without PMTCT interventions) and a 
2% chance with PMTCT. I find no reason to believe that anyone, 
having accepted these figures, can dispute the notion that a 35% 
chance of becoming HIV-infected is unacceptably high. The mag-
nitude of the infection, if it occurs, is similarly indisputable. About 
20% of those children infected through MTCT proceed to AIDS or 
die in their first year of life, while more than half would die by age 
2.8 Compared with their uninfected counterparts, their overall mor-
tality rates are ninefold and greater.8 Without antiretroviral drugs 
(ARVs), most HIV-infected children, with ever-weakening immune 
systems, will die before their fifth birthday from opportunistic infec-
tions.
Some may dismiss this picture of paediatric HIV as overly pessi-
mistic, given the era of ARVs which have so transformed the lives 
of HIV-infected persons. While I accept that these drugs have in-
deed greatly improved the quality and prolonged the lives of those 
afflicted, I do not believe that this in any way alters the morality of 
the issues at hand. For example, the presence of a surgeon on 
stand-by should not justify or lessen the injuries inflicted on one 
person by another, even with the prospect of the surgeon promptly 
attending to the injuries.
2. The resulting HIV infection sets back the child’s welfare 
interests, which constitutes serious harm to him/her. To some, 
the harms alleged here are in fact implausible as the subject in 
question is a prenatal being who possesses no actual interests of 
his/her own. This stance is, however, mistaken in  view of the ex-
pectation that, all things being equal, the child will be born and that 
this consideration in itself makes it reasonable to ascribe to the 
child certain future interests which would then have the potential to 
be set back, even before that potential person becomes an actual 
person.6 Feinberg, in arguing for this point, tells the anecdote of a 
motorist who, in running over a pregnant woman, causes damage 
to the fetus, which is later born deformed and chronically ill. Here it 
could be said that the child’s future interest of normal mobility was 
set back during his/her prenatal life.
With HIV infection, the child’s basic welfare interest in being 
healthy and long-lived is frustrated as he/she faces a shortened 
life with limited prospects for achieving any ulterior interests that 
she/he may grow to develop; it is noteworthy that the fact that it 
may be just one of the welfare interests affected does not make 
the harm any less serious or acceptable. As Rescher observed, 
‘welfare interests, taken together, make a chain that is no stronger 
than its weakest link’ as deficiencies in one area cannot be com-
pensated for by superiority in another.6
3. The mother’s action is the only one that can reduce the 
risk. Actions of third parties cannot reduce the risk of this seri-
ous harm to the child’s welfare interests. One may argue that the 
woman’s decision to opt out should be viewed as an omission 
which merely allows harm to occur and is not a harmful act per 
se. If indeed the act-omission distinction matters, the question 
then would be whether omissions count as do acts, in relation to 
the harm principle. I maintain, as does Feinberg, that the acts-
omission distinction should not matter in the harm principle. If one 
perceives the harm principle as a harm prevention tool, then the 
difference between acts and omissions is irrelevant, as each of 
these ‘acts’ can equally result in harm.6 The ultimate end of forbid-
ding people from actively causing harm is harm prevention, and 
it would be misguided to think that it could be achieved if others 
were still allowed not to prevent harm even when they could rea-
sonably be expected to.
4. Abstention from PMTCT is unjustifiable (and therefore 
wrongful) as it could typically be done without an unreason-
ably high risk to the mother. By unreasonable risk here, I mean 
(to use Peter Singer’s words) ‘without thereby sacrificing anything 
of comparable moral importance’.9 The sacrifices in question, in 
this case, equate to what are commonly cited as ‘barriers’ to HIV 
testing in PMTCT programmes. Studies have identified the follow-
ing barriers, among others: (i) fear of knowing one’s status, (ii) fear 
of stigma, (iii) negative attitudes of health workers, (iv) perceived 
lack of support from male partners.10,11 One can make the following 
general comments regarding these barriers:
4.1 From a programmatic point of view, there is no reason why 
these should stop the establishing of a routine testing programme 
as they merely suggest that such a programme would need mech-
anisms to address all these concerns.
4.2 It is unclear how the decision to decline an HIV test really 
escapes these perceived barriers when one considers that, for an 
infected mother and child, these would be inescapable realities 
when the disease ultimately presents.
4.3 Even if these were not inescapable, it would be a dubious 
choice for a mother to make that puts her future child directly at 
risk of the things she herself fears. Arguably, the mother, possess-
ing better coping mechanisms as an adult, is the one in a better 
position to deal with these challenges.
On balance, it would appear that the risks implicated here are 
less than the risk of premature death and poor health that babies 
face if they become HIV-infected. As such, a decision not to face 
the inconveniences to prevent serious harm to the child is unjust 
and constitutes wrongful harm. An important exception here, re-
lated to HIV testing, could be that of fear of violence from a partner. 
It is an exception because partner violence can result in unaccept-
ably high risks to the mother, even including death. With such risk 
levels, potential harm to the child should not be seen as wrongful 
or unjust as it occurs in a context of excusable reasons. However, 
reports tend to show that such partner violence is usually not un-
predictable; therefore, there would plausibly be cases where the 
possibility of fear of partner violence may not in itself be a fac-
tor in opting out of PMTCT programmes. One study, for exam-
ple, showed that behaviour such as alcohol abuse, verbal abuse, 
having more than one current partner, and a previous history of 
violence by the male partner are predictive of partner violence;12 
therefore the converse should apply where such behaviour is ab-
sent.
5. Routine testing, as a coercive measure, represents a mech-
anism for safeguarding the baby’s moral rights from this un-
fair harm. By continuing with the policy of voluntary testing, with 
its low uptake rates, South Africa continues to compromise the 
welfare rights of vulnerable children – rights which cry out for that 
society’s protection.
These conclusions should not, in my view, have much bearing 
on the closely related subject of abortion, in which the main is-
sue seems to be whether the fetus’s moral status outweighs the 
woman’s right to control of her body. The fact that the pregnant 
woman in consideration here voluntarily decides to take the preg-
nancy to term, when the option of abortion exists, I believe marks 
an important difference between the present subject and that of 
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abortion and its related issues of moral status in prenatal life. The 
decision to take the pregnancy to term shifts matters from whether 
there is a moral obligation on the woman to carry the pregnancy 
to term (i.e. the abortion debate) to questions about the welfare of 
the baby whom she intends to give birth to. 
5.1 Routine testing could result in more harm than good. In the 
context of the harm principle, this is a serious concern because, 
if it is correct, it could invalidate the use of the harm principle to 
justify routine testing. As already mentioned, the coercive action 
taken must be superior to other alternatives if it is to be justified 
by the harm principle. More harm, it may be argued, could result 
in the following:
Fear and distrust of health facilities. Routine testing policy 
could result in women not seeking antenatal care and health care 
in general for fear of HIV testing. Furthermore, routine testing may 
in fact not even achieve the goal of reducing mother-to-child HIV 
transmission, as there is no causal link between testing and ef-
fective uptake of preventive interventions by  pregnant women. 
While these are credible concerns, lessons from  Botswana’s opt-
out system, which evoked the same concerns upon its inception in 
2004, should not be ignored. A recent paper concludes that Bot-
swana’s ‘shift to routine HIV testing resulted in a dramatic increase 
in testing and in PMTCT service delivery without measurable ad-
verse effects’, giving it the highest uptake now of any PMTCT pro-
gramme in Africa.13
Gender bias and its possible consequences. Another con-
cern could be that routine testing in PMTCT will result in more 
women being tested for HIV than men, meaning that any disad-
vantages associated with HIV testing (like stigma) will dispropor-
tionately affect women. This extra liberty-limiting layer would be 
an unwelcome outcome when one considers the already compro-
mised status of women’s rights. The harm, then, that routine test-
ing could do in this setting would discourage and further alienate 
women from their attempt to exercise their moral agency in their 
communities.14
Several replies can be made here. The issue that would in fact 
have been problematic is if women were ‘singled out’ arbitrarily. 
There is, however, a clear rationale as to why any PMTCT policy 
aiming to prevent harm to children would have to target pregnant 
women. As already mentioned, it is the mother’s decision of en-
rolling in a PMTCT programme that can reduce the risk of HIV 
transmission in pregnancy to the baby. Needless to say, PMTCT is 
not the only plausible HIV prevention programme. Making a case 
for routine testing of women, in response to a specific issue of 
PMTCT, does not suggest that no such case could be made for 
other target groups in the community, if the merits for such a case 
existed.
  As per the issue of stigma, the following also can be noted: (i) 
as already said, not testing voluntarily for HIV does not make one 
escape the inevitable eventuality of an AIDS diagnosis; (ii) it would 
be morally questionable if one should shift the burden of HIV-re-
lated stigma to unborn children who, if infected, are likely to face 
that stigma at a very young age, when they lack the psychological 
coping mechanisms which adults (supposedly) possess. Indeed, 
also from a utilitarian perspective, it is unclear how a strategy of 
dealing with HIV-related stigma should result in more people being 
born HIV-infected, and more people not testing and being treated 
for HIV infection; and (iii) where stigma to the HIV-infected exists, 
the solution is not to stop prevention strategies – as the World 
Health Organization and others have rightly suggested, any pre-
vention strategy needs to be accompanied by stigma-reduction 
mechanisms and policies.
Regarding the longstanding general issue of women’s vulnera-
bility and socially sanctioned power imbalances, it is important to 
acknowledge and highlight it as a legitimate and serious matter de-
serving due consideration. Addressing it, however, should not stop 
PMTCT. It would be unfortunate to suggest that this complex, endur-
ing societal phenomenon must be solved first, before children’s 
welfare interests can be taken seriously.
Conclusion
I have argued that, although an opt-in system for HIV testing in 
PMTCT is ideal from a civil liberties standpoint, it has proved in-
competent in securing the welfare rights of South Africa’s children. 
Routine testing, advocated in the paper, has been offered as an 
alternative which seems to take seriously the prevention of wrong-
ful harm to the welfare rights of our coming generation.
I thank Dr M van den Hoven as well as an anonymous reviewer 
of this journal for their input in the writing of this paper. The views 
and conclusions of this paper are the author’s own, and do not 
necessarily reflect views of Botswana’s Ministry of Health.
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